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Abstract
This article will examine the European Community’s environmental policy and how spill-over
effects in that area led to a transfer of powers from the Member-State to the Community level. It
will also examine the manner in which governmental functions in this area are distributed between
the two levels and, thus, whether the characteristics of a federal structure can be discerned.
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INTRODUCTION
Recently, there has been a sudden surge in interest in the
European Community. Most of this interest has been caused
by publicity surrounding the program to complete the European Community's single market, a process commonly referred to as the "1992 program." As this is essentially an economic process, most of the emphasis is on the economic aspects of this program. However, when the process of
European integration was started in the early 1950s, economic
cooperation was not seen as an end in itself but rather as a
means to achieve political unity.
When the late French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman
launched the idea of creating what would become the European Coal and Steel Community, he stated that in order to create a real chance for peace, a united Europe had to be created.'
The idea was that as economic integration developed, there
would be spill-over effects into other areas, which finally would
lead to a "European Union." 2 Schuman even indicated the
form of government such a union should have when he stated
that his proposals would "build the first concrete foundation of
the European Federation ....
1. R. Schuman, The Schuman Plan Declaration (May 9, 1950) (regarding the
creation of the European Coal and Steel Community), reprinted in European Community Information Service, Press Release of May 9, 1970, at 1-2 (available from the
European Community's Washington Delegation).
2. The preamble of the EEC Treaty refers explicitly to the creation of "an ever
closer union .... " Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar.
25, 1957, preamble, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I1) at 1 (official English
version), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 14 (1958) (unofficial English trans.) [hereinafter EEC
Treaty].
3. Schuman, supra note 1, at 2.
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British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher recently started
a new round of debates in the discussion over the degree of
European integration and the form such integration should
take. She declared that "willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign states is the best way to build a successful European Community." 4 In her mind such cooperation "does not require power to be centralised in Brussels or
decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy.' '
This Article will examine the European Community's environmental policy and how spill-over effects in that area led to a
transfer of powers from the Member-State to the Community
level. It will also examine the manner in which governmental
functions in this area are distributed between the two levels
and, thus, whether the characteristics of a federal structure can
be discerned.
I.

THE FEDERAL SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY

In its famous judgment in the Costa v. ENEL case,6 the
Court of Justice found that there was a difference between
traditional international treaties and those upon which the European Communities (the "Treaties")

7

were founded:

By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its
own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity
and capacity of representation on the international plane
and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States
to the Community, the Member States have limited their
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields ....
'
4. M. Thatcher, Speech by the Prime Minister on Britain's Policies Towards Europe, Trade and Defence 4, given at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium (Sept.
20, 1988) (available at the Fordham InternationalLaw Journaloffice) (emphasis added).
5. Id.
6. Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, 1964 E.C.R. 585, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8023.
7. EEC Treaty, supra note 2; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community (Euratom), Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179 II) at 1,
(official English version), 295 U.N.T.S. 259 (unofficial English trans.); Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Apr. 18, 1951, 1973 Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. 2 (Cmd. 5189) at 1 (official English version), 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (unofficial English trans.).
8. Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 593, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8023, at 7390.
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In another paragraph of the same judgment the Court
held that "[t]he transfer by the States from their domestic legal
system to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights .... 9
Thus, unlike a traditional international organization, the
Community does have its own "sovereign" rights, which have
been transferred to it by its Member States. By using the term
"transfer" and by indicating that the powers of the Community
stem from a limitation of the sovereign rights of the Member
States, the Court clearly indicated that the relation between
the Community and its Member States is based on a distribution
of powers ("rights and duties"). In other words, the acquisition of powers by the Community results in a loss by the Member States of their law-making capacity with regard to the subject matter at issue.'"
In his study on federalism and supranational organizations, Peter Hay defined the "federal principle" as being present, inter alia,
whenever ... there is a process involving the transfer of a
substantial portion of the power and authority to govern
free from interference to a central authority, established for
some specific purpose or purposes, by two or more groups
which are fairly homogeneous in themselves but differ from
each other in some significant respect(s) as a result of which
they desire to retain a substantial portion of the power and
authority to govern themselves free from interference from
either the other group or groups or from the central authority . . .and ... when there is freedom to exercise without
interference the power which was transferred or retained."
In examining whether the European Communities can be
said to have a federal character, the question, therefore, partly
seems to be the manner in which governmental powers are distributed between the Community and the Member-State levels
and whether these powers can be exercised free from interfer9. Id. at 594, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8023, at 7391.
10. See P. HAY, FEDERALISM AND SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 183 (1966) (citing Ophiuls, Quellen und Aufbau des Europdischen Gemeinschaftsrechts, 16 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHR-r 1697, 1699 n.10, 1751 (1963)). This does not exclude law-making
by the Member States in implementation of a Community Directive.
11. Id. at 98 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
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ence. The answer to these questions is to be found in the laws
governing the Communities and not in the laws of its Member
States. In its well-known case law on the supremacy of Community law, the Court has consistently held that no limits can
be imposed on the powers of the Community by 2the law of its
Member States, not even by their Constitutions.1
The Treaties do not contain lists of the subjects falling
within the Communities' jurisdiction. This does not mean,
however, that the Communities have unlimited jurisdiction.
Like other international organizations, they have to act within
the framework of the Treaties that created them.' 3 Because
they can only become active when a Treaty provision specifically gives ("attributes") them the powers to do so, the
Treaties are often referred to as giving "comp6tence
d'attribution." 14

In the EEC Treaty this attribution of power is created, in a
general manner, by Article 2, which lays down the tasks of the
Community,' 5 and by Article 3, which enumerates the various
activities that it shall perform.' 6 In addition, the Community
institutions do need, however, a specific provision giving them
the power to act. We will examine how in the environmental
field the Treaties provide the Community with the necessary
powers.
II.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY UNDER
THE ORIGINAL TREATIES
A.

Absence of Specific Treaty Provisions

Originally, none of the three Treaties creating the Community contained provisions specifically "attributing" the
power to act in the area of environmental policy. Indeed, the
word "environment" was not even mentioned in any of the
three Treaties. The absence of specific powers apparently
meant that the Community could not become active in this
12. See Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 585, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8023.
13. See Tizzano, The Powers of the Community, in THIRTY YEARS OF COMMUNITY LAw
43 (1981).
14. Id.
15. See EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 2, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 3, 298
U.N.T.S. at 15.
16. See id. art. 3, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 3-4, 298 U.N.T.S. at 15-16.
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field and, therefore, that the Member States were still responsible for implementing environmental policy.
However, in the early 1970s, the Community adopted
measures that at least partly had the aim of protecting the environment.' 7 In March 1970, for example, the Council adopted
a directive on measures against air pollution caused by motor
vehicles. 8 This directive and others, on issues such as the biodegradability of detergents 9 and the sulphur content of certain fuel-oils, 2" were adopted pursuant to the so-called "General Program for the elimination of technical barriers to trade
within the Community."' l In these three instances, the Community directives laid down Community-wide standards,
22
which, to some extent, replaced differing national standards.
Goods produced and marketed in accordance with those "harmonized" standards could then be sold throughout the Community. Obviously, differences between national standards can
create technical barriers to trade, regardless of the purpose
served by those standards.
The Community standard, however, will necessarily have
the same objective as the national standards it seeks to harmonize. In the case of the first directive mentioned above, the
national standards involved sought to limit air pollution
caused by exhaust gases from motor vehicle engines. Consequently, the Community directive had the same aim, i.e., to
protect the environment.23
The facilitation of intra-Community trade was not the only
17. One directive was adopted even earlier. Council Directive No. 67/548, 10
J.O. L 196/1 (1967), OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1967-68, at 234, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
3451, was aimed at protecting the population against dangerous substances and
preparations and could thus be considered to have, at least to some degree, an "environmental objective."
18. Council Directive No. 70/220, 13 J.O. L 76/1 (1970), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1970, at 171, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,917 [hereinafter Directive 70/220].
19. Council Directive No. 73/404, OJ. L 347/51 (1973).
20. Council Directive No. 75/716, OJ. L 307/22 (1975).
21. Council Resolution of May 28, 1969, 12J.O. C 76/1 (1969).
22. In some cases, the Community standard becomes the only applicable standard, thus replacing existing national standards or creating a standard where none
previously existed. This is normally referred to as "total harmonization." In other
cases, the Community standard applies throughout the Community, but Member
States have the option to allow the marketing of other products. This is called "optional harmonization."
23. See Directive 70/220, supra note 18.
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reason why the Community institutions wanted to become active in the environmental field. A number of disasters, having
a dramatic environmental impact, occurred in Europe. The
Torrey Canyon 24 and Amoco Cadiz25 disasters, which resulted in
huge oil leakages polluting long stretches of beach and killing
many animals and other forms of life, made many people realize not only the extent of the hazards presented to the environment by modern day economic activities, but also that international cooperation was required to effectively combat these
dangers.
These realizations were recognized by the heads of state
and government of the Member States of the Community
when, at their "summit meeting" in Paris in October 1972,
they decided to establish an EC environmental policy. In the
declaration published at the end of their two-day meeting (the
"summit declaration"), this concern was expressed in just two
sentences: "The Heads of State and Government stressed the
value of a Community environment policy. They are therefore
requesting the Community Institutions to draw up an action
programme with a precise schedule before 31 July 1973."26 As

a follow-up to this summit declaration, the Commission submitted a draft action program to the Council, which the latter
approved in November 1973.27
It is interesting to see how the Council addressed the issue
of the Community's powers in the environmental field. The
program was approved by a declaration (the "Programme on
the Environment") adopted not only by the Council, but also
by the "representatives of the governments of the Member
States meeting in the Council."'28 This is the formula normally
used in cases where the issues partly fall outside Community
24. In 1967, the tanker Torrey Canyon broke up off southwest England, dumping
620,000 barrels of oil on the English and French coasts.
25. In 1978, the tanker Amoco Cadiz, carrying 68 million gallons of oil, broke in
half after ramming a reef, dumping oil on the Brittany coast. See U.S. Supertanker Splits
in Two; Oil Begins Fouling Brittany Shore, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1978, at 20, col. 5.
26. Declaration of The First Summit Conference of the Enlarged Community,
reprinted in E.C. Bull No. 10, at 14, 20 (1972).
27. Council Declaration of Nov. 22, 1973, on the Programme of Action of the
European Communities on the Environment, OJ. C 112/1 (1973) [hereinafter Programme on the Environment]. This was not just a Council declaration, but also a
declaration adopted by the representatives of the governments of the Member States
meeting in the Council.
28. Id.
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"competence."

29

In spite of this, the Programme on the Environment, quite
surprisingly, then states:
[1]n accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty, the task of the
European Economic Community is to promote throughout
the Community a harmonious development of economic activities and a continuous and balanced expansion, which
cannot now be imagined in the absence of an effective campaign to combat pollution and nuisances or of an improvement in0 the quality of life and the protection of the environ3
ment.
After this statement, the conclusions that "improvement
in the quality of life and the protection of the natural environment are among the fundamental tasks of the Community" and
that "it is therefore necessary to implement a Community environment policy" 3' hardly come as a surprise.
The Commission, in an attempt to get the Council to
agree that environmental measures could be adopted by the
Community, decided to put a precise action program to the
Council for approval. This was somewhat unorthodox, because the Commission, under the institutional set-up of the
EEC Treaty, has the monopoly of making proposals and, thus,
of initiating the decision-making or legislative process, without
being told by any other institution when to make a proposal or
what kind of proposal should be made.
That is, however, exactly what the action program does: it
defines the objectives and principles of the EC's environmental
policy, describes the measures that should be taken, and contains a detailed list, with time-table, of the measures to be
taken. The program even goes so far as to state that the priorities may be modified by the Council, on the initiative of the Commission. 33
29. Here-and quite frequently in literature on E.C. law-the word "competence" is used not in its traditional meaning of "ability," but, rather, in the French
meaning of "powers" or "responsibility."
30. Programme on the Environment, supra note 27, at 1-2.
31. Id.at 2.
32. There are a few exceptions to this monopoly power, such as Article 84(2) of
the EEC Treaty, before this Article was amended by the Single European Act (the
"SEA"), infra note 100, and the new Article 130s, which was added by the SEA.
33. See Programme on the Environment, supra note 27, at 2.
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Such modification has occurred three times: in 1977, 4 in
1983, 35 and in 1987.36 These decisions are sometimes referred to as the second, third, and fourth environmental programs. In reality though, there is only one program, which has
been periodically updated and amended.
B.

The Search for Other Possible Legal Bases

The Community's action program indicates, inter alia, the
measures that should be adopted but does not itself provide
the legal basis for doing so. That basis still had to be found in
the EEC Treaty. As the Treaty does not contain any specific
provisions on the environment, a more general provision had
to be used. The action program did not even indicate which
legal bases could be considered. In reality though, two bases
have been used: Articles 100 and 235 of the EECTreaty,
sometimes separately, sometimes combined.
1. Article 100
Article 100,31 which allows the approximation of "such

provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States as directly affect the establishment or
functioning of the common market,"'3 8 is the general provision

in the EEC Treaty on the harmonization of legislation. It contains two non-procedural requirements: there must be provisions of national law that can be "approximated," and these
provisions must "directly affect" the establishing or functioning of the Common Market.39
. The first requirement has not kept the Commission
from
were
in
where
no
provisions
submitting proposals in cases
force in any of the Member States, although drafts were being
34. Council Resolution on the Continuation and Implementation of a European
Community Policy and Action Programme on the Environment, Oj. C 139/1 (1977).
35. Council Resolution on the Continuation and Implementation of a European
Community Policy and Action Programme on the Environment (1982 to 1986), O.J.
C 46/1 (1983).
36. Council Resolution on the Continuation and Implementation of a European
Community Policy and Action Programme on the Environment (1987-1992), O.J. C
328/1 (1987).
37. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 37-38, 298
U.N.T.S. at 54.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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discussed in some of them. 40 Given that concerns about the
environment are still fairly recent and that many environmental issues are, therefore, not yet governed by specific provisions, it seems a bit odd to first wait for the introduction of
national measures or, at least, for such measures to be proposed, before the Community can become active.
The second requirement gives rise to more problems. In
the instances mentioned above, 4' differences between national
standards created obstacles to the free circulation of goods,
but not all environmental provisions will have so clearly a direct effect on the Common Market. Former Advocate-General
VerLoren van Themaat has no doubt about measures that "are
intended to regulate access to, or action in, the markets for
goods, services, labor, or capital, and that have a direct effect
on trade between the Member States. ' '4 2 However, environmental measures will often not have such an objective. According to VerLoren van Themaat, measures with a different
objective can also have a direct effect on the Common Market,
but then the influence must have some quantitative effect
"even though it need not be susceptible of precise measure43
ment."
Measures to protect the habitat of an endangered species
of wildlife, for example, will not normally have such an effect.
Thus, Article 100 cannot be used. The effective protection of
such habitats may, however, require measures that transcend
the national level. In such cases the Community has used Article 235.
40. See, e.g., Commission's Proposal for a Council Directive on the Indication by
Labelling of the Energy Consumption of Domestic Appliances, O.J. C 212/2 (1978).
The "considerant" in the recitals justifying the use of Article 100 simply states that
the information "is currently supplied in various ways, either in accordance with national regulations or in the absence of such regulations; whereas this situation is
likely to create non-tariff barriers to intra-Community trade .... " Id. at 3. The
subsequent directive, Council Directive No. 79/530, O.J. L 145/1 (1979), Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 3327, contained the same recital, though, in the meantime, national measures had been introduced in at least one Member State. Id. at 7, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 3327, at 2539.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20.
42. VerLoren van Themaat, Harmonization of Laws, in [HE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A COMMENTARY ON THE EEC TREATY 3-467, 3-551 (1988)
[hereinafter LAw OF THE EEC].
43. Id.
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Article 235

Although the Treaty only allows the Community institutions to become active when specific powers are provided, its
drafters wanted to create a dynamic and developing Community, rather than a static one." Article 235 is the main expression of this wish. It allows Community action that is necessary
to attain, in the course of the operation of the Common Market, one of the objectives of the Community without the necessary powers having been proyided.4 5 In such cases, the Council can act unanimously on a proposal from the Commission
and after consulting the European Parliament.46
Let us now take each of the non-procedural conditions of
Article 235 and apply them to the environmental sector.
The necessary powers have not been provided. As just discussed,
Article 100 allows for the taking of measures in the environmental field under certain conditions. Thus, in these cases, Article 235 cannot be used. 47 However, Article 235 must be
used, sometimes jointly with'Article 100, in order to justify
provisions that cannot be taken on the basis of Article 10048
Community action should prove necessary. It could be argued
that this phrase means that Article 235 can only be used if a
certain issue necessarily requires Community, rather than joint
Member-State, action. Similarly, one could then ask whether
in such cases the Member States have lost their ability to act.
44. Kapteyn, Preliminary Observations on Articles 235-236, in LAW OF THE EEC, supra
note 42, at 6-267.
45. The text of Article 235 is as follows:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course
of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council

shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate measures.
EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 235, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 73, 298 U.N.T.S. at
91.
46. Id.
47. As Article 100 of the Treaty only allows for the adoption of directives, the
Commission has argued-in the customs area-that Article 235 can be relied on for
adopting other types of instruments, especially regulations, when the adoption of

directives is inappropriate.
48. Thus, the Commission's Proposal for a Council Directive on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to Noise Emitted by Lawn Mowers,
OJ. C 86/9 (1979), contained mostly provisions which could be based on Article
100. When, however, a provision was included to restrict the use of these machines
to certain hours and certain days, it was decided to add Article 235.
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Both theses have been denied,4 9 and we tend to agree with this
approach. As this touches upon the central issue discussed in
this Article, we will come back to it later.
In the course of the operation of the common market. As Kapteyn
has indicated in his commentary on Articles 235 and 236, several differing views have been expressed on the exact meaning
of this clause, which demonstrates that its meaning is not all
that obvious.5 0 As does Marenco, 5 ' we interpret this clause as
requiring that the measures adopted under Article 235 not impair the proper functioning of the Common Market. This obviously does not exclude the adoption of environmental measures.
To attain one of the objectives of the Community. How should
the word "objectives" be interpreted? This is especially important in the environmental field, because, as indicated
above, neither the preamble nor Articles 2 and 3 of the EEC
Treaty refer to the protection of the environment as an objective of the Community. It should be recalled, however, that
the Council has in fact used Article 235 to adopt measures in
the environmental field. How then did it take this "hurdle"?
The Council sometimes leaned heavily on the Treaty's
preamble. In the directive on the conservation of wild birds,
for example, the Council referred to "the objectives regarding
the improvement of living conditions, a harmonious development of economic activities throughout the Community and a
continuous and balanced expansion ....": On another occasion, the Council spoke more directly of "the Community's
objectives in the sphere of the protection of the environ3
ment."49. See Kapteyn, supra note 44, at 6-287.
50. See id. at 6-291.
51. Marenco, Les Conditions d'Application de 1'Article 235 du Traiti C. E.E., 131 REVUE DU MARCHk COMMUN 147 (1970).
52. Compare Council Directive No. 79/409, OJ. L 103/ (1979) [hereinafter Directive 79/409] with EEC Treaty, supra note 2, preamble, 1973 Gr.Brit. T.S. No. 1,at
1, 298 U.N.T.S. at 14. The preamble of the Treaty refers specifically to the objectives
of improving "the living and working conditions," strengthening "the unity of...
economies" and ensuring "their harmonious development," and guaranteeing
"steady expansion." EEC Treaty, supra note 2, preamble, 1973 Gr.Brit. T.S. No. 1,
at 1, 298 U.N.T.S. at 14.
53. See, e.g., Council Directive No. 85/337, O.J. L 175/40 (1985). It is true that
the paragraph containing the-words quoted goes on to speak of "the quality of life,"
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The fact that the latter attitude could already be found in
the Council declaration approving the original action program
shows that this interpretation of the Treaty is not new. Ajustification is given by Marenco, who distinguishes a category of
objectives that can be derived from the Treaty as a whole,
though they cannot be specifically based on any particular Article.54
C.

The European Court ofJustice's Case Law

The question whether the Community has the powers to
act in the environmental field has come up in a number of
cases. In Commission v. Italy,55 the Italian government claimed
that it did not have to implement Directive 73/404,56 regarding the biodegradability of detergents, by the deadline provided therein. Because the directive dealt with the protection
of the environment-which was not within the Community's
"competence"-Italy did not consider it a directive but rather
an international convention drawn up in a special form.
The Court observed, first of all, that the directive not only
sought to protect the environment, but also sought to eliminate barriers resulting from disparities between provisions of
national law. Thus, the directive could be validly based upon
Article 100. The Court did not stop there, however, but went
on to say:
[I]t is by no means ruled out that provisions on the environment may be based upon Article 100 of the Treaty. Provisions which are made necessary by considerations relating

to the environment and health may be a burden upon the
undertakings to which they apply and if there is no harmonization of national provisions
on the matter, competition
57
may be appreciably distorted.
While the Italian defense may have been somewhat unexpected and surprising, the Court's judgment certainly wasn't.
but this does not change the fact that a separate environmental protection objective
is referred to.
54. See Marenco, supra note 51, at 149.
55. Commission v. Italy, Case 91/79, 1980 E.C.R. 1099, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8657.
56. Council Directive No. 73/404, OJ. L 347/51 (1973).
57. Commission v. Italy, 1980 E.C.R. at 1106, 8, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8657, at 7781.
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The latter cannot be said, however, of the judgment in Brleurs
d'Huiles.58 This preliminary ruling concerned the directive on
the disposal of waste oils. 5 9 Under this directive, the Member
States were required to set up a system for the safe disposal of
waste oils. To this effect, they were allowed to draw up zones
within which specifically licensed companies had to carry out
the collection and/or disposal of the oil "where appropriate in
the zone assigned to them by the competent authorities. '"60
The French authorities implemented this directive by providing that waste oils could only be disposed of by making
them available to an approved company in a given zone or by
keeping them if the company had a permit for the disposal itself. The French association, defending the interests of burners of waste oils, attacked the French legislation, inter alia, on
the grounds that it was incompatible with the Treaty provisions on the free circulation of goods.
The Court replied by stating, first of all, that "the principle of freedom of trade is not to be viewed in absolute terms
but is subject to certain limits justified by the objectives of general interest pursued by the Community provided that the
rights in question are not substantively impaired." 6 '
The Court then went on to state that "[t]here is no reason
to conclude that the directive has exceeded those limits. The
directive must be seen in the perspective of environmentalprotection, which is one of the Community's essential objectives." '62
This statement came as a surprise and did not seem to be
necessary for deciding the case. The main question before the
Court was whether environmental policy reasons could justify
exceptions to the free circulation of goods. For this to be the
case, the Court did not have to find that environmental protection was an essential objective of the Community. Although,
for instance, national security reasons can justify exceptions to
the free circulation of goods under Article 36 of the EEC
58. Procureur de la R~publique/ADBHU, Case 240/83, 1985 E.C.R. 531, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,164.
59. Council Directive No. 75/439, OJ. L 194/23 (1975).
60. Id. art. 5, at 24.
61. ADBHU, 1985 E.C.R. at 549,
12, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,164, at
15,993.
62. Id. at 549,
13, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,164, at 15,993 (emphasis

added).
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Treaty, few Treaty experts would defend the proposition that
security matters are within the Community's powers.
I If the statement was not needed, why then was it made?
The most likely reason seems to be that the Court wanted to
indicate that environmental protection was a valid justification
for "measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions," in the same manner that Article 36, and especially
the "Cassis de Dijon ' 63 jurisprudence, justify such restrictions.
The quoted paragraph must then be read as referring to the
protection of the environment as a "mandatory requirement.''

4

This reading would be in line with the Court's conclusion,
which states that the French provisions do not go beyond the
restrictions that are justified by the pursuit of the objective of
environmental protection, which is in the general interest. 65
The Court, in its recentjudgment in the Danish returnable
bottles case, 66 confirmed that this reading is indeed correct.
There, the Court concluded from the waste oil case that environmental protection is a mandatory requirement that can
limit the application of Article 30.67
Does this mean that the Court does not think that Article
235 can be used to adopt measures with a specific purpose to protect the environment? This conclusion does not necessarily
63. See Rewe v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fir Branntwein, Case 120/78, 1979
E.C.R. 649, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8543. Rewe-Zentral AG, a West German
importer, attempted to import from France "Cassis de Dijon," a spirit containing 15
to 20% wine-spirit by volume. The West German government informed Rewe that
the imported "Cassis de Dijon" could not be sold because of a regulation providing
"that only potable spirits having a wine-spirit content of at least 32%" could be sold
in that country. Id. at 651, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8543, at 7779. The Court,
interpreting Article 30 of the EEC Treaty, held that this quantitative restriction on
alcohol content did not serve a purpose that was in the general interest. Id. at 662,
14, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8543, at 7787. The "Cassis de Dijon" jurisprudence, therefore, refers to the prohibition on measures having an effect equivalent to
quantitative restrictions on imports in Article 30 of the Treaty.
64. In Rewe, the Court held that "[o]bstacles to movement within the Community resulting from disparities between the national laws relating to the marketing of
the products in question must be accepted in so far as those provisions may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements .... Id. at 662,
8, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8543, at 7786.
65. ADBHU, 1985 E.C.R. at 552, 30, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,164, at
15,994.
66. Commission v. Denmark, Case 302/86, 1988 E.C.R. - (not yet published).
67. Id. at

-.
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follow from the judgment. The directive at stake in the waste
oils case was partly based on Article 235. The national court
raised not only questions on the interpretation of the directive
but also on the validity of certain articles thereof. The Court
of Justice has made clear that the procedure laid down in Article 17768 is one of "judicial cooperation," in which two courts,
each within their own sphere, contribute directly and reciprocally to the decision of a case.6 9
If, therefore, the Court had considered the directive ultra
vires because the Treaty, and especially Article 235, did not
permit the adoption of this sort of environmental measure, it
could have been expected to inform the national court thereof.
Possibly on the basis of this more indirect argument, the
Court, in the waste oils case, accepted the principle that Article
235 can be used to pass legislation in the environmental
field.7 °
That still does not mean, of course, that any kind of environmental measure would be possible. Waste in general, and
waste oils in particular, are clearly economically tradeable
goods. The important question, therefore, is whether Article
235 also allows for legislation on environmental issues that do
not have an economic impact. The two cases mentioned do
not directly provide an answer to this question.
D.

The Use of Article 235 by the Council and the Commission

Although never sanctioned by the Court, the Commission
and the Council have used Article 235 in a wide variety of
cases. These include measures on the conservation of wild
birds,7 1 migratory species, 7 2 and natural habitats.73 Even in
these cases, the Commission and the Council normally man68. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 177, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I, at 58, 298
U.N.T.S. at 76-77.
69. See, e.g., Schwarze v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle Getreide, Case 16/65, 1965
E.C.R. 877, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8039.
70. Procureur de la R6publique/ADBHU, Case 240/83, 1985 E.C.R. 531, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,164.
71. Directive 79/409, supra note 52.
72. Council Decision 82/461, on the Conclusion of the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, OJ. L 210/10 (1982).
73. Council Decision 82/72, Concerning the Conclusion of the Convention on
the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, O.J. L 38/I (1982)
[hereinafter Decision 82/72].
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aged to find some economic aspects. Thus, the birds directive
dealt with economic activities such as catching wild birds or
reaping bird eggs, 4 while the decision on protection of the
natural habitats provided that such habitats could not be used
for economic purposes.75
These examples show, in fact, that it is rather difficult to
think of environmental measures that do not have some economic impact. Article 235 does not, however, require just any
economic impact but, rather, a necessity to attain one of the
objectives of the Treaty. What the Commission and the Council have really done is consider environmental measures as part
of the effort to improve the living and working conditions of
the people of the Member States, which, according to the preamble of the EEC Treaty, is an "essential objective" of the
Community.76
It must be admitted that from a legal point of view, this is
not a very convincing argument. As stated above, the Court
has not yet given its position on this issue. Many writers are of
the opinion that the legal foundations of the Community's environmental policy in fields not directly related to the basic
the free
principles of the Common Market, and, in particular,
77
circulation of goods, are not all that strong.
It is obvious, however, that until the Court strikes down
the Council's interpretation, the latter paves the way toward
the adoption of virtually any kind of environmental measure.
Indeed, there does not seem to be one single case in which the
Community-both the Commission and all members of the
Council-wanted to adopt certain environmental measures but
refrained from doing so because it did not have the necessary
powers to act.
E.

The "Danish Problem"

A unanimous decision of the Council is required for the
Community to use its powers under Article 235. This means
74. See Directive 79/409, supra note 52, art. 5, at 3.
75. See Decision 82/72, supra note 73, art. 7(3), at 4.
76. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, preamble, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 1, 298
U.N.T.S. at 14.
77. See 2 E. REHBINDER & R. STEWART, INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY 18-19 nn.12-13 (1985) (providing an extensive list of
writers).
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that even the more doubtful cases mentioned above received
the agreement of all of the Member States. In this context,
Denmark's position is particularly interesting.
Denmark has traditionally been one of the most reluctant
in accepting the use of Article 235. At the same time, for domestic political reasons, it placed a high priority on environmental policy. Although it could, therefore, agree with the
aims pursued by most of the Commission's proposals in the
environmental field, it did have a problem when these proposals were based on Article 235. Another aspect of this so-called
"Danish problem" was that Denmark often opposed proposals
founded on other Treaty provisions, especially Article 100,
that would lower the level of environmental protection already
in place in Denmark on the basis of existing national legislation. 78 As both Articles 100 and 235 required a unanimous
Council decision, these problems often meant that proposals
were being blocked in the Council without much hope of an
early compromise.
F. An External Environmental Policy for the Community
We have thus far discussed the possibilities for an environmental policy within the Community. It is obvious, however,
that this area often calls for action on an even wider scale. As
the original Treaties did not provide any internal powers in the
environmental field, it is hardly surprising that no external
powers were provided either.
As with the case of the internal powers, this does not mean
that the Community cannot act externally. Basically, there are
two ways in which the Community can become, active in this
field. Article 113 can be used if the environment is to be protected through the regulation of international trade.79 In
other cases, the Community can invoke the theory of "parallelism": if the Community has the internal powers to act on environmental issues, it can do so externally as well. If the internal
powers have already been exercised, the external powers will
often be "exclusive," which means that they do not leave any
powers to the Member States.
78. The same was true for provisions on the protection of workers.
79. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 113, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 42-43, 298
U.N.T.S. at 60.
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1. Article 113
Since the end of the transitional period (January 1, 1970),
Article 113 has given the Community an exclusive power to act
on international trade matters. If environmental protection
calls for restrictions on imports or exports, the question, therefore, arises whether Article 113 could or even should be used.
This question has come up in relation to import restrictions on
whales or other cetacean products and on seal pups and products derived from them (especially seal skins). It has also come
up in discussions regarding the implementation in the Community of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (the "Washington Convention" or "CITES"). 8 0 As the name indicates, this convention dealt specifically with international trade and, therefore,
under Article 113, the Community would seem to be exclusively responsible.
Although the convention was concluded after the end of
the transitional period, the Community did not participate in
the negotiations and was not a party to the convention. Some
of its Member States were, however, party to the convention,
which created a number of problems. Some of these problems
were solved by the inclusion in the convention of an article that
excludes trade within a customs union from the application of
the convention. As not all Member States were parties to the
convention, however, many other problems remained.
In order to solve these problems, the Commission sent a
proposal to the Council for a regulation that amounted to
nothing less than a de facto implementation of CITES in the
whole Community, including the Member States not party to
the convention. 8 ' The Commission proposal was based on Article 113.82 However, during the discussions in the Council,
several Member States raised objections to this legal base.
In the first place, it was said that Article 113 only covered
measures whose final objective was to regulate trade. If, as in
80. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, Washington, D.C. (concluded in the fiamework of the
United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP)).
81. See Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Implementation in the Community of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, O.J. C 243/16 (1980).
82. Id.
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this case, the import restriction was merely an instrument to
achieve other objectives, then Article 113 was not available.8"
Furthermore, some Member States simply did not want to use
Article 113 because it would give exclusive powers to the Community. In the end the Council decided to use Article 235,84
the same article that had been used earlier for the import restrictions on whales8 5 and which would again be used in the
86
case of the import prohibition on skins of certain seal pups.
From a strictly legal point of view, Article 113 should have
been used in all of these cases. The fact that the regulation of
trade was only incidental does not seem to be a convincing argument for excluding the use of the Article. It could be argued that trade regulation is never an end in itself. Placing
import restrictions on textile products or levying import duties
on alcoholic beverages, for instance, are done with the purpose
of protecting national manufacturers or the health of the population. Such measures are, however, founded on Article 113
without any discussion.
2.

External Powers Stemming from Kramer and ERTA

In its judgment in Kramer,8 7 the Court had to decide
whether the Community, in the absence of specific Treaty provisions authorizing it to enter into international commitments,
could, nevertheless, be allowed to do so.8 8 The Court's answer
was summarized in the following terms:
The Court has concluded inter alia that whenever Community law has created for the institutions of the Community
powers within its internal system for the purpose of attaining a specific objective, the Community has authority to
enter into the international commitments necessary for the
attainment of that objective even in the absence of an ex83. This has also been the position of the Legal Service of the Council and is
reflected in the fourth "whereas" recital to Council Regulation No. 3626/82, OJ. L
384/1 (1982) [hereinafter Regulation 3626/82]. This "whereas" clause mentions the
need to uniformly apply "certain commercial policy instruments .
Id.
84. See id.
85. Council Regulation No. 348/81, O.J. L 39/1 (1981).
86. Council Directive No. 83/129, OJ. L 91/30 (1983).
87. Kramer, Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76, 1976 E.C.R. 1279, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8372.
88. Id. at 1307-08,
16-20, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8372, at 7741.
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press provision in that connexion. 8 9
According to this so-called theory of "parallelism," the
Community can act externally whenever it has the powers to
act internally. As long as the Community has not used these
powers, the Member States are still free to act independently.
However, once the Community has exercised its powers, either
internally or externally, Member States are no longer allowed
to take measures or enter into any agreements "which might
affect those rules or alter their scope," as was stated by the
Court in its famous ERTA judgment.9 0 Thus, in such cases, the
Community enjoys exclusive powers.
Where the Community wants to act on the basis of the
Court's Kramer or ERTA case law, the concept of parallelism
means that the legal base to be used externally is the one from
which the internal powers follow. Thus, an international
agreement in an area where the Community has already
adopted a directive based on Article 100 should then be negotiated and ratified on the basis of that article. If the internal
powers result from Article 235, it is this article that is to be
used for the external action. 9 '
In all cases in which the Community participates in international negotiations-with or without previously existing internal legislation-it is the Commission that negotiates on behalf of the Community.9 2 Although no mandate from the
Council or the European Parliament is required, it is obviously
89. Opinion 1/76, O.J. C 107/4, at 12 (1977).
90. Commission v. Council, Case 22/70, 1971 E.C.R. 263, 275, 22, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8134, at 7525. That case considered international Member State
action that was taken after the Community had passed legislation internally. This is
just one example of a possible conflict with Article 5, which requires Member States
to abstain from any measure that might jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of
the Treaty. See EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 4, 298
U.N.T.S. at 17.
91. Similarly, the Council used Article 43 to conclude the Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. See Council Decision 81/691,
O.J. L 252/26 (1981).
92. Article 228 of the EEC Treaty states:
[W]here this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between the
Community and one or more. States or an international organisation, such
agreements shall be negotiated by the Commission. Subject to the powers
vested in the Commission in this field, such agreements shall be concluded
by the Council, after consulting the Assembly where required by this Treaty.
EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 228, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 71-72, 298 U.N.T.S.
at 90.
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useful for the Commission to know at least the views of the
Council. Otherwise the embarassing situation might arise in
which the Commission would negotiate an agreement that the
Council would then refuse to "conclude." It is in the framework of these informal consultations that the Member States
have a possibility to influence the decision whether or not the
Community should participate in certain negotiations.
If Member States would like to participate in an international agreement in an area in which the Community has partly
exercised its powers, they can only do so if the Community
participates as well. This led to interesting debates-both between the Community and its Member States and with "third"
countries including the United States-in relation to the Vienna Convention for the protection of the ozone layer 93 and a
supplementary protocol, the so-called Montreal Protocol, on
substances that deplete the ozone layer.9 4 Both were jointly
signed and ratified by the Community and several of its Member States.9 5
Although the parallelism criteria of the Kramerjudgment
seems rather easy to apply, the criterion used in the ERTA decision creates more difficulties in practice. It is not always clear
when or how an obligation entered into by a Member State
"might affect [community] rules or alter their scope."
Three different interpretations of this criterion have been
defended. 96 According to the first, the Community would be
exclusively responsible for the whole of the subject-matter on
which it had legislated. The second interpretation limits that
exclusive responsibility to only those international agreements
that would affect the existing legislation or alter its scope; insofar as this is not the case, Member States could still act. The
third interpretation justifies the exclusive Community responsibility on the basis of the text of the regulation that was at
93. The Vienna Convention was signed on March 22, 1985. See Council Decision 88/540, OJ. L 297/8, annex I, at 16 (1988).
94. The Montreal Protocol was negotiated and adopted September 16, 1987.
Id. at 27.
95. Id. at 9; see also Council Regulation No. 3322/88, O.J. L 297/1 (1988) (on
certain chlorofluorocarbons and halons which deplete the ozone layer).
96. For a discussion of these interpretations, see Temple Lang, The ERTAJudgment and the Court's Case-Law on Competence and Conflict, in 6 Y.B. EUR. L. 183, 197-203
(1986).
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issue in the ERTA case. 7 Had that regulation not specifically
barred Member States from concluding international agreements, then they could still have done so, according to this interpretation.
The third interpretation seems too restrictive and is difficult to defend on the basis of the wording of the judgment. If
Member States would not have been able to conclude any
agreement in this area, why then did the Court speak of affecting existing legislation or altering its scope? The exact consequences of the first two interpretations can be illustrated very
well by applying them to the case of CITES.
As indicated above, CITES was implemented at Community level at a time when the Community was not even a party
to it.9" CITES contains a list of protected species, which can
be amended by a two-thirds majority of the parties present and
voting. Such amendments would then apply to all parties except those making a formal reservation. Conceivably, some
Member States might agree to the inclusion of a certain species
while others might object. Whether each Member State could
then vote as it liked, or whether each Member State would
either have to vote in the same way as other Member States or
abstain from voting, depends on which of the above interpretations is accepted. The first interpretation would exclude any
independent role for the Member States externally, even
though the implementing regulation contains a provision, article 15, which allows Member States-under certain conditions-to adopt stricter measures. 9 Precisely because of this
provision, it could be argued that the second interpretation
mentioned above would allow Member States individually to
vote for an amendment to the appendices of CITES, even
though the whole Community had not decided in favor of it.
Some Member States have argued that this example illustrates that the first interpretation is wrong. If, in fact, Member
States would still have the possibility of internally adopting
measures that differ from the regulation, why then would they
not have the right to vote for them externally? The final an97. See Council Regulation No. 543/69, 12J.O. L 77/49 (1969), oJ. Eng. Spec.
Ed. 1969, at 170.
98. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
99. See Regulation 3626/82, supra note 83, art. 15, at 14.

334 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 12:311
swer in this debate will have to be given by the Court of Justice, which has not yet conclusively done so. That answer will
ultimately depend on whether or not the Community is seen as
on the way to becoming a "real" federation. In a federation of
states, it is usually the federal authorities who are solely responsible for external relations, even though the states may
well have a large degree of internal independence. The first
interpretation, viewed in this perspective, is certainly the most
federalist. It may, therefore, also be a bit too early for its
"adoption."
III.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY UNDER THE SINGLE
EUROPEAN ACT

As far as protection of the environment is concerned, the
Single European Act (the "SEA") 0 0 amended the EEC Treaty
in two respects. First, a new title, dealing specifically with the
environment (the "Environmental Title") was inserted in part
three of the EEC Treaty.' 0 ' Second, a reference to the level of
environmental protection was included in the new Article 100a
on the harmonization of legislations. 0 2 That same article also
contains a possibility for Member States to "opt out" of harmonized measures on grounds of major needs relating to the
environment. 0 3 This article shall examine each of these provisions and their interrelation.
It is interesting to note that neither Article 2 nor Article 3
of the EEC Treaty have been amended by the SEA. Thus,
although an environmental title was added, it was not deemed
necessary to add environmental protection to the objectives or
the activities of the Community. This seems to indicate thatat least according to the negotiators of the SEA-such protection was already included in the original Treaty.
A.

Why Were New Provisions Needed?

If the Community institutions could already adopt all nec100. Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987).
101. See id. art. 25, at 11.
102. See EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100a(3), added by Single European Act,
supra note 100, art. 18, at 8.
103. See id. art. 100a(4), added by Single European Act, supra note 100, art. 18, at

1989]

EC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

335

essary environmental measures by using either Article 100 or
Article 235, why then were new provisions needed at all?
As decided at the European Council meeting in Milan, the
objectives of the SEA were to streamline the decision-making
process and make it more democratic, and confirm the necessity of completing the single market by the end of 1992. Some
Member States had political problems with both of these
objectives. Streamlining the decision-making process would
lead to increased powers for the European Parliament, which
some Member States equated to diminishing the powers of
their own national Parliaments; this was clearly not a very popular result.
Confirming the necessity of completing the single market
gave rise to somewhat different objections. Some Member
States with high standards of protection in the environmental
field, for example, feared that the commonly agreed standards
that would replace their national standards would offer a lower
level of protection. This could happen because under the
SEA, harmonization of national standards, in most cases,
would no longer require unanimity.
In order to overcome the first problem, the Commission
suggested the inclusion in the new Treaty of a chapter on the
environment. Although not exclusively, this suggestion seems
to have been intended, in particular, to avoid Danish opposition to the SEA. Denmark opposed the transfer of powers
from the national to the European Parliament and also attached a high priority to environmental protection. It was
hoped that the inclusion of the environmental chapter would
be seen as being so positive that it would outweigh the negative aspect of an increased transfer of powers to the European
Parliament.
The problem caused by the fear that lower Communitywide standards would replace higher national standards was to
be solved by the, inclusion in the new Treaty of a possibility to
"opt out" of a harmonized standard for reasons relating, inter
alia, to environmental protection. This article will discuss each
of these aspects separately.
B.

The New Environmental Title

The new Environmental Title was inserted into part three
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of the Treaty, concerning the Community's policies, and not
into part two, which means that the environment is not mentioned among the "foundations of the Community." This is
interesting, because one could well argue that environmental
considerations should be part of any policy decision that the
Community makes, whether such decision is on agriculture,
transportation (both of which policies are found in part two),
industrial, fiscal, or other policies. A clean environment could,
therefore, also have been included among the principles of the
Community in part one of the Treaty.
During the first years of the EC's environmental policy,
the emphasis was clearly on the adoption of specific legislation,
rather than on "integrating" environmental thinking into
other Community policies. During the 1980s the Commission
began to stress this latter aspect.'" 4 This policy is confirmed
by a provision in Article 130r, which makes environmental protection a component of the European Community's other policies.
Of course, the conclusion that the insertion of the Environmental Title was not meant to change anything works both
ways: the negotiators did not want to create new powers, but
at the same time, they did not want to limit the scope of the
Community's existing environmental policy. De Ruyt explains
that questions would have been otherwise raised about the legality of those measures that had already been adopted, which
would have created problems not only internally but also with
regard to "third" countries and international organizations. 0 5
A limitation of the Community's powers in the environmental
field would indeed have raised doubts about the validity of certain obligations that the Community had agreed to in the international arena.
The new Environmental Title consists of three articles,
numbered 130r, 130s, and 130t. The first lays down objectives
and principles, the second the procedure for implementing en104. See, e.g., Council Regulation No. 797/85, O.J. L 93/1 (1985), which makes
the protection and improvement of the environment an important part of a scheme
of investment aid to farmers. This regulation represents not only a recognition of the
important role that farmers play in the conservation of the natural habitat, but also
acts as a guarantee that no investment aid is given to projects that do not take environmental protection criteria into account.
105. J. DE RuYT, L'ACTE UNIQUE EUROPtEN 214 (1987).
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vironmental policy, and the third makes possible more stringent national measures.
1. Article 130r
a.

The Objectives

Article 130r defines, in rather broad terms, the objectives
of the Community's "action" with regard to the environment:
to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment,
to contribute towards protecting human health,
to ensure a0 6prudent and rational utilization of natural
resources.1

The broad character of these objectives reflects the wish
to include everything that the Community had already
adopted. Originally, the Commission had proposed a much
longer list, but fear of leaving out a measure finally led to the
shorter but much broader description. 10 7 According to
Vandermeersch, 0 8 the fact that the second and third objective
could, in principle, also be covered by the first does not mean
that the latter objective should be interpreted narrowly. This
view would be in line with the Court's tendency to broadly interpret the provisions that grant powers to the Community institutions.
How then should the second and third objectives be interpreted? Both the protection of human health and the rational
utilization of natural resources seem to be on the edge of environmental protection. Rather than an addition to the first objective, these two objectives should be seen as confirming the
fact that both issues are part of the EC's environmental policy.
In this sense, they stress how large the scope of the EC's environmental policy really is. As De Ruyt points out, it was precisely for this reason that Member States insisted that unanimity still be required for the implementing measures.' 0 9
Although the unanimity rule already formed an interesting
106. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 130r(l), added by Single European Act, supra
note 100, art. 25, at 11.
107. DE Ruy-r, supra note 105, at 214.
108. Vandermeersch, The Single European Act and the Environmental Policy of the European Economic Community, 12 EUR. L. REV. 407, 413-14 (1987).
109. See DE RuyT, supra note 105, at 215.
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guarantee that the Community would not "abuse" its powers,
the negotiators !went a step further on the third objective by
adopting a declaration that "confirmed" that the Community's
activities in the sphere of the environment may not interfere
with national policies regarding the exploitation of energy resources. Although the exact legal value of these declarations is
still unclear, they at least give some indication as to the "original intent" of the negotiators.
b.

The Principles

The second paragraph of Article 130r states three principles that shall guide the EC's environmental policy. These
principles are "that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source,
and that the polluter should pay."" A fourth principle, that
environmental protection requirements shall be a component
of other policies, does not relate directly to the environmental
policy, but to those other policies. The emphasized words ("as
a priority") qualify only the second, and not the other, principles. Does this mean that those principles should be seen in
absolute terms? And are these the only principles governing
the environmental action, or are there still other, possibly even
higher principles that, in case of conflict, may even overrule
the ones listed in Article 130r? A further question that arises is
whether compliance with these principles will be a factor when
the Court is asked to review the legality of an environmental
or, in the case of the fourth principle, other measure.
The first question will have to be answered in the negative.
If the first principle had to be taken strictly there would not
really be a need for the second one, for if preventive action
must be taken at all times, then no damage will occur. Similarly, if damage does occur, then the first principle apparently
has been violated.
If the main objective of the negotiators of the new Environmental Title was to codify existing rules rather than create
new ones, then a further argument can be deduced from the
historic development of these principles. The "polluter-pays"
principle, for example, was introduced in the Community's en110. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 130r(2), added by Single European Act, supra
note 100, art. 25, at 11 (emphasis added).
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vironmental policy in the very early stages. The "first" action
program made this principle a cornerstone of that policy, and
in March 1975, the Council recommended to Member States
that in respect of allocation of costs and of action by public
authorities in the field of environmental protection, they conform, inter alia, to the polluter-pays principle as contained in
the Commission's communication annexed to this recommendation." I The principle should not be seen in absolute terms,
as the communication allows for exceptions and for it to be
overridden by other principles.
This is made clear by point three of that communication,
which states:
[I]f identifying the polluter proves impossible or too difficult, and hence arbitrary... the cost of combating pollution
should be borne at the point.., and by the legal or administrative means which offer the best solution from the administrative and economic points of view and which make
the most effective
contribution towards improving the envi1 12
ronment.
In addition to the fundamental principles such as those
that exclude arbitrary, discriminatory, or disproportionate decisions, the language just quoted seems to formulate yet another overriding principle, i.e., the one of "making the most
effective contribution to the improvement of the environment." The fact that the Council's recommendation and the
accompanying communication have not been amended following the entry into force of the SEA seems to indicate that the

negotiators did not intend to change the character of the principle; they did not intend to make the principle an absolute
one, nor one that allows no exceptions. It also seems to confirm that the environmental policy must be guided by not only
the three principles mentioned, but by others as well.
The question whether the Court will review the validity of
Community legislation in the environmental field on the basis
of its compatibility with these principles is an interesting and
important one. A positive answer would mean that decisions
11. Council Recommendation 75/436, Regarding Cost Allocation and Action
by Public Authorities on Environmental Matters, O.J. L 194/1 (1975) [hereinafter
Recommendation 75/436].
112. Id. at 2.

340 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 12:311
that require private parties to pay certain sums of money-for
example, to contribute to certain clean-up schemes-could be
attacked on the basis that the Community regulations or directives upon which such decisions are founded violate the polluter-pays principle.
It is hard to find a reason why the Court would not admit
such a review. As indicated above, however, the principles
should not be seen in absolute -terms and are subject to certain
exceptions. Thus, the institutions of the Community can claim
a relatively large discretionary margin, which means that the
Court will be very restrictive in its review and will only declare
a regulation or directive invalid when it contains a manifest error, when it constitutes a misuse of power, or when 3the institution clearly exceeds the bounds of its discretion."1
As already stated, the fourth principle of Article 130r is
somewhat different from the other three, first of all because it
relates to the other policies of the Community. This means
that it is really a separate "track" of environmental policy.
Rather than emphasizing specific environmental action, this
track emphasizes the importance of integrating environmental
considerations into other policy decisions.
The principle is worded in rather strong terms: "Environmental protection requirements shall be a component of the
Community's other policies.""' 4 Does this mean that for each
individual decision reached in the framework of any other policy, the Community must demonstrate that the environmental
"component" has been considered? This seems somewhat exaggerated. In cases in which the environmental impact is
rather obvious, it can be argued, however, that the recitals do
need to include a paragraph explaining the manner in which
the environmental component was taken into account. Because of the wide scope of the environmental policy, this is
likely to affect many measures. As these considerations must
only be a "component," the discretionary margin is, again,
fairly wide, which means that judicial review will lead to the
invalidity of the measure only in exceptional cases.
113. See, e.g., Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, Case 136/77, 1978 E.C.R. 1245,
1256, 4, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8494, at 8864.
114. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 130r(2), added by Single European Act, supra
note 100, art. 25, at 11.
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c. Matters to be Taken Account of
The third paragraph of Article 130r requires that the
Community, in preparing its environmental action, take account of
available scientific and technical data,
environmental conditions in the various regions of the
Community,
the potential benefits and costs of action or of lack of
action,
the economic and social development of the Community as a5whole and the balanced development of its regions.' 1

The second and fourth points are interesting because they
seem to allow for what is sometimes referred to as "differentiation," i.e., different rules for different regions to take account
of objective differences in the environment, the economy, and
social developments.
One of the first examples of such "differentiation," even
before the SEA was negotiated, was partly based on environmental arguments. The first Directive on the lead content of
petrol ("Directive 78/611")'16 required Member States to fix
the maximum level of lead in gasoline at a value between 0.40
and 0.15 grams per liter. Article 7 of Directive 78/611, however, allowed Ireland to establish a higher lead content. The
reasons for this were two-fold. The Irish oil refineries did not
have the required technology and, thus, were not suited to
produce the required low-lead gasoline (this would be the economic balancing referred to in the fourth point of Article
130r). At the same time, the environment in Ireland was not as
polluted with lead as was the rest of the Community, so that a
slightly higher lead content could be objectively justified (the
second point mentioned above). The legality of such a "differentiation" has never been challenged. The Treaty, however,
now seems to provide a basis for it.
The wording of the four points mentioned above contains
many ambiguities. It does seem, however, that in the case of a
conflict between a principle (on which the environmental poll 15. Id. art. 130r(3), added by Single European Act,.supra note 100, art. 25, at 1112.
116. Council Directive No. 78/611, O.J. L 197/19 (1978).
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icy shall be based) and one or several of the elements formulated here (which shall only be taken account of) the former
would take precedence. Most of the conclusions formulated
above, in relation to the principles of environmental policy,
would, it seems, also apply in this case. Because the principles
are more directly related to the policy decisions than are the
points that should be taken account of, judicial review, though
possible, is even less likely to lead to measures being declared
invalid than in the case of the "principles."
d. Distribution of Powers Between the Community
and its Member States
According to the fourth paragraph of Article 130r, the
Community shall become active in the environmental field only
if the objectives formulated in the first paragraph "can be attained better at Community level than at the level of the individual Member States.""' 7 This has sometimes been referred
to as the principle of "subsidiarity,"" 8 but as Roelants du
Vivier, Vice-President of the European Parliament's Environmental Committee, and Hannequart point out," 9 this misses
the point.
This provision is without precedent in either the original
Treaties establishing the Community or in the other codified
policies in the SEA. This still does not mean, however, that the
new environmental title brings about a change from the previously existing 'situation. Because of the unanimity requirement
in both Articles 100 and 235, the Community has never been
able to legislate under these articles unless all Member States
were of the opinion that a certain issue could be better dealt
with at Community, rather than at Member-State, level.
Why then was the insertion of this principle necessary?
First, because Article 130s provides for possible majority voting, and certain measures could, therefore, be adopted against
the will of a Member State. The negotiators, furthermore,
wanted to avoid situations in which Commission proposals
117. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 130r(4), added by Single European Act, supra
note 101, art. 25, at 12.
118. See, e.g., Vandermeersch, supra note 108, at 422.
119. Roelants du Vivier & Hannequart, Une Nouvelle Stratigie Europienne pour
l'Environnementdans le Cadre de lActe Unique, 316 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 225, 228
(1988).

1989]

EC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

were blocked in Council without any hope of ever being
adopted. The simple existence of these proposals would create political pressure on the Council and on individual Member States.
The principle does raise some interesting legal questions,
however. For example, can it be invoked in a judicial procedure? As in the cases discussed before, the answer clearly has
to be yes. This immediately raises the question of how the
Court can determine whether a criterion as vague and subjective as "better" has been met? In most cases, the Court, indeed, will have to base its decision on the fact that all, or at
least a qualified majority, of the members of the Council apparently found that the pursued objective could be better attained at Community level and would, thus, have to declare the
measure valid.
There may be cases in which the Council clearly went beyond its discretionary margin in this respect. This may well
lead the Court to declare the measure invalid. Such cases will,
however, be extremely rare. They will not, for example, necessarily include all cases in which a Community standard offers a
lower level of protection than some or even all of the national
standards it harmonizes. The Community-wide character of
the measure may, in fact, add certain advantages that outweigh
the disadvantage of a less strict standard.
A further question that arises is whether the clause limits
only the powers of the Community or also limits those of its
Member States, in the sense that these Member States would
no longer be able to act in areas where the Community could
"better" attain the pursued objective. This is an interesting
thesis but is difficult to defend on the basis of the text of paragraph four. According to that text, the Community shall take
action to the extent that certain conditions are met. Had the
negotiators wanted a "two-way" criterion, they would have
chosen a more neutral expression, such as when the objectives
can be better attained by the Community.
The conclusion, therefore, must be that although the
clause does not have any practical consequences because in the
past Member States would not agree to Community measures
that could be "better" passed at Member-State level, the
clause, nevertheless, transforms a factual situation into a legal
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requirement. Because the word "better" is of a rather vague
and subjective character, this legal requirement is not very
strong, and, thus, the powers of the Community institutions
are only marginally affected. Because this is a very crucial provision in the Community's federal system, we will return to it in
the last section of this article.
e.

Financingand Implementing Non-Community Measures

Another very interesting provision in the framework of
our topic is found in the second sentence of paragraph four of
Article 130r. According to this sentence, the Member States
shall, "[w]ithout prejudice to certain measures of a Community
nature ... finance and implement the other measures. ' 120
The meaning and intention of this provision are not immediately clear. Vandermeersch concludes that this provision
leaves the power of implementation to the Member States and,
therefore, that it reveals a preference for the use of directives
rather than regulations. 12 He goes a step further when he
concludes from this clause that the Community is "a legislator
only" because the implementation and financing of Community
environmental measures would be reserved to the Member

States. 122
This provision can be seen in its proper perspective only if
one keeps in mind that the environmental title was an attempt
to codify existing Community policy. In 1983, the Commission made a proposal for a regulation on what was officially
called "acti6n by the Community relating to the environment"
13
but was commonly referred to as the "environment fund."'
This controversial proposal would have allowed Community
120. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 130r(4), added by Single European Act, supra
note 100, art. 25, at 12.
121. See Vandermeersch, supra note 108, at 423-24. A directive is "binding ...
upon each Member State to which it is addressed," but leaves to the Member State
"the choice of form and methods," while a regulation is "binding in its entirety and
directly applicable in all Member States." EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189, 1973
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 60, 298 U.N.T.S. at 79.
122. Id: at 424-25.
123. Proposal for a Council Regulation on Action by the Community Relating to
the Environment (ACE), OJ. C 30/8 (1983). The proposal was in fact intended to
create the necessary framework for using funds that the European Parliament had
allocated to specific budget headings with an aim of constituting a "European Fund
for the Environment." Id.
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funding of various environmental actions undertaken at the national level. Some Member States feared that this was the start
of a full-fledged environmental fund, similar to the existing
Regional and Social Funds.

24

In their minds, this fund would

have intervened to an unacceptable degree in their national
policies. The granting of funds for actions to preserve wildlife
habitats might, for example, frustrate national zoning or industrial policies and generally provide some ammunition to opponents of certain environmentally harmful developments.
Against this background, the second sentence of paragraph four of Article 130r is much more understandable. Contrary to Vandermeersch's thinking, this sentence applies only
to the financing and implementation of "other" measures, i.e.,
non-Community measures. Thus, no preference is being expressed for any particular kind of measure or manner of financing as concerns Community action. An attempt is made,
however, to make it impossible for the Community to finance
national environmental policies.
Does this only apply to a possible Environmental Fund or
are all so-called "Structural Funds,"i125 and perhaps even the
European Investment Bank, affected? The principle is in no
way restricted to an Environmental Fund, and there is really no
reason why it should not apply to any kind of financial support
in this field. The clause must be read in context, however, and
thus applies only to "action relating to the environment." This
should presumably be read as specific action and not to include any more general type of activity that also has an environmental effect.
f. The Community's Powers in the External Relations Field
The first sentence of paragraph five of Article 130r provides that "[w]ithin their respective spheres of competence,
the Community and the Member States shall cooperate with
third countries and with the relevant international organiza124. See EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 123, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 45, 298
U.N.T.S. at 63; id. art. 130b, added by Single European Act, supra note 100, art. 23, at
9.
125. According to Article 130b of the Treaty, "Structural Funds" include the
Guidance Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, the
European Social Fund, and the European Regional Development Fund. Id.
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tions." 1 26 Thus, the Community does not have a general responsibility for the external relations in the environmental
field but only for those that~are "within its sphere of competence."
But even within that sphere, the Community does not automatically have so-called "exclusive competence," as is clear
from the second subparagraph of point five, which states that
"[t]he previous paragraph shall be without prejudice to Membodies
ber States' competence to negotiate in international
12 7
and to conclude international agreements."
This must be read together with a Declaration of the
"Conference" according to which the second paragraph does
not affect the principles resulting from the judgment handed
down by the Court of Justice in the ERTA case. Again this
means that the previously described situation under the original Treaties remains intact.
Thus, exclusive responsibility arises only in cases where
the ERTA principle applies, while in other areas there is only a
potential responsibility, according to the rule "inforo interno, in
foro externo." This also seems to imply that where the internal
Community powers are restricted, as in the case where Member States can "better" achieve a certain objective, this same
restriction applies externally.
The procedural requirements for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements are-according to the second sentence of the fifth paragraph of Article 130r-to be
found in Article 228. This is, again, no change from the previous situation.
2.

Article 130s

Article 130s t 28 lays down the procedure for the implementation of the Community's environmental policy. The first paragraph contains the normal procedure, which is almost identical to the previously used procedure of both Articles 100 and
235. 129 This means, inter alia, that the unanimity requirement
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. art. 130r(5), added by Single European Act, supra note 100, art. 25, at 12.
Id.
Id. art. 130s, added by Single European Act, supra note 100, art. 25, at 12.
Id. The first paragraph of Article 130s provides that "[t]he Council, acting

unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, shall decide what action is to be
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still stands and that the cooperation procedure, introduced by
the SEA in many other areas, does not apply.
The second paragraph makes it possible for the Council,
"under conditions laid down in the preceding subparagraph,"
to "define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by
a qualified majority."' 130 Thus, the Council could unanimously
decide that a certain category of environmental measures shall
be decided by a qualified majority. Although when the SEA
entered into force it seemed highly unlikely that this provision
would ever be used, the current tendency towards more qualified majority voting may well make this possible in the environmental area too. In the first instance, it will probably be limited to less politically-sensitive measures. For these measures,
however, Article 145, as amended by the SEA,' 3 ' provides for a
system under which the Council lays down the principles that
shall then be implemented by the Commission.
3.

Article 130t

The final article of the Environmental Title, Article
130t,' 32 provides that "[t]he protective measures adopted in
common pursuant to Article 130s shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more' 33stringent protective measures compatible with this Treaty."'
This principle could already be found in many environmental measures adopted under the original Treaty, but has
now been made generally applicable. The exact meaning depends on the interpretation given to several of the somewhat
ambiguous expressions in this provision. What, for instance,
are "protective measures," and when are they "compatible
taken by the Community." Id. This procedure is, in fact, identical to the procedure
in Article 100. In comparison with Article 235, it adds the requirement of consulting
the Economic and Social Committee. This seems fairly logical for measures with an
important economic impact, but is somewhat surprising for measures that are purely
environmental. It would have appeared more logical for such measures to be submitted to a special advisory body on environmental policy, similar to the one existing in
the consumer protection field.
130. Id.
131. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 145, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 51, 298
U.N.T.S. at 69, as amended by Single European Act, supra note 100, art. 10, at 6.
132. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 130t, added by Single European Act, supra
note 100, art. 25, at 12.
133. Id.
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with this Treaty"? Is the adjective "protective" used to limit
this possibility to only one of the three categories in the first
34
objective of Article 130r?1
As for this last question, the reply can hardly be positive,
as no justification can be seen for treating the measures to preserve or to improve the quality of the environment differently
than those that are to protect it. Again, the truth is probably to
be found in the previously existing situation. Although many
directives and regulations contained a "minimum-harmonization" clause, it was only used in cases that did not involve an
aspect of harmonizing conditions under which companies from
different Member States could compete. Obviously, if the
Community intended to place all competitors on an equal footing, then Member States could not be allowed to reintroduce
certain differences. This is, presumably, the way in which Article 130t must be read, i.e., as not allowing stricter national
measures if the objective of the Community legislation was not
only environmental protection but also, for example, the free circulation of goods.
National "protective measures" are only allowed if "compatible with this Treaty." This may be a reference to Articles
30 through 36 of the Treaty, but if the above interpretation of
the word "protective" is correct, this is not very likely. In cases
where intra-Community trade might be affected, the Community measure will normally aim not only at protecting the environment, but will also aim at facilitating the free circulation of
goods, thus rendering stricter national measures impossible.
There are, however, other Treaty provisions that must be
respected, such as Article 5135 and Article 7. l 6
Should the polluter-pays principle also be respected? As
indicated above, the reference to that principle in Article 130r
only applies to "action by the Community." Member-State action is not governed by a binding principle of this kind but by a
134. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
135. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 4, 298
U.N.T.S. at 17 (Member States should not adopt measures that make it harder for the
Commission or Council to fulfill their tasks).
136. Id. art. 7, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 4, 298 U.N.T.S. at 17 (prohibiting,
within the scope of application of the Treaty and without prejudice to any special
provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality).
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recommendation. 137 It would be hard to claim that failure to
respect the latter amounts to a violation of the Treaty. This is
important, for if the principle did apply, it would probably be
much harder to adopt stricter measures. These might then, indeed, lead to higher costs for national industry and, therefore,
to a less favorable competitive position. It is obvious that this
would be a disincentive to such stricter measures.
C.

Harmonization of Environmental Legislation

As indicated above, the first Community measures in the
environmental field were based on Article 100 and were aimed
at eliminating barriers to intra-Community trade, resulting
38
from differences between national environmental standards.' 139
The fact that the new Article 100a, introduced by the SEA,
contains two references to environmental policy demonstrates
that the SEA did not intend to change this by having all measures that affect the environment adopted in the framework of
the new Environmental Title.
According to the third paragraph of Article 100a, "[t]he
Commission, in its proposals envisaged in paragraph 1 conprotection ...
cerning ... environmental
' 40
protection."'
of
level
high

will take as a base a

This provision reflects the criticisms of several Member
States, according to whom the Community directives on harmonization of legislation too often led to the lowest common
denominator. It is interesting, however, that although the
clause is only addressed to the Commission, most of the criticism dealt not with the Commission's proposals, but with the
Council's decisions, which, because of the need to find compromises, often had the danger of leading to a low standard.
The new clause only refers to the proposals envisaged in
paragraph 1 of Article 100a, which means that it does not apply to harmonization proposals under Article 100 or to any
other proposals, including those under the new Environmental
Apparently, the reason for this was that Article 100a
Title.'
137. Recommendation 75/436, supra note 111.
138. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
139. See EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100a, added by Single European Act, supra
note 100, art. 18, at 8.
140. Id. art. 100a(3), added by Single European Act, supra note 100, art. 18, at 8.
141. A different position is apparently defended by Vandermeersch, who men-
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allows decision-making by a qualified majority, whereas the
other two provisions still require unanimity. There was fear
that the introduction of majority decision-making might lead
to situations in which some Member States with high levels of
protection could be out-voted and thereby forced to lower
those levels of protection. 14 2 The German and Danish negotiators especially had expressed this fear. The fact, of course,
that the clause only applies to Commission proposals makes
this argument much less convincing. It was precisely for this
reason that a so-called "opting-out" procedure was also included. 1 43 Article 130s does not present the same problems,
because it still requires unanimity and, in addition, normally
allows stricter national measures.
The new requirement seems of little legal importance, as
it is hardly imaginable that there would be any judicial recourse if the Commission were to disrespect it. Article 173 allows the Court to review the legality of acts other than recommendations or opinions. 1 44 Although not excluded from doing so, it is highly unlikely that the Court would145review directly
the legality of a proposal of the Commission.
D.

"Opting-Out" of Community-Wide Standards

A second mention of environmental protection in-Article
100a is found in paragraph four, which reads as follows:
If, after the adoption of a harmonization measure by the
Council acting by a qualified majority, a Member State
deems it necessary to apply national provisions on grounds
of major needs referred to in Article 36 or relating to protection of the environment ... it shall notify the Commission of these provisions.
tions this provision as one of the basic principles of EEC environmental action. See
Vandermeersch, supra note 108, at 415. However, later in the same text,
Vandermeersch claims this provision is not an integral part of EEC environmental
policy. Id. at 417.
142. See DE Ruy-r, supra note 105, at 74-75.
143. See infra text accompanying notes 146-48.
144. See EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 173, 1973 Gr. Brit T.S. No. 1, at 57, 298
U.N.T.S. at 75-76.
145. The only, and very remote, possibility would be judicial review of an individual decision, addressed to a private person or to a company, that was based on a
Council Act adopted on the basis of a proposal that did not "take as a bas[is] a high
level of protection."
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The Commission shall confirm the provisions involved
after having verified that they are not a means of arbitrary.
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between
Member States.
By way of derogation from the procedure laid down in
Articles 169 and 170, the Commission or any Member State
may bring the matter directly before the Court ofJustice if it
considers that another Member State is making improper
use of the powers provided for in this Article.' 4 6
This rather long and complicated procedure is normally
referred to as "opting-out." For the above reasons, it is again
only part of Article 100a and not part of either Article 100 or
130s. This procedure is, in fact, what is left in the SEA of the
two-tiered or multi-tiered Europe. The debate over such a
"Europe-A-la-carte" had been going on for several years, especially after the Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans, in his
report on the European Union, 14 7 suggested a new approach
in which those States that had the possibility of making progress had the duty to go forward. At the same time, the other
States would receive aid to try to "catch-up."
Tindemans's suggestion was made in an effort to escape
"Eurosclerosis," which, according to many, was caused by the
fact that there were "good" European nations, which were prepared to move forward toward European integration but could
not do so because others, who under the unanimity rule also
had to agree, could not or would not follow.
The final version of the SEA is only slightly reminiscent of
Tindemans's suggestions. It is based on the premise that decisions are made by a qualified majority. The Member States
that, under the unanimity rule, would have blocked "progress"
towards a Community compromise could now be out-voted.
Rather than offering a general possiblity for Member States to
maintain or introduce different national rules, the provision
subjects this right to certain conditions as well as to a Community review procedure.
The conditions are such that one could argue that the minority, rather than the majority, is moving forward. Different
146. See EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100a(4), added by Single European Act,
supra note 100, art.118, at 8.
147. Report on European Union, reprinted in E.C. Bull. Supp. 1/76, at 11 (1976)
(presented by Leo Tindemans to the European Council).
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national measures must, in fact, be justified on the grounds of
"major needs referred to in Article 36, or relating to protection of the environment or the working environment .....""4
This can only mean that the measures must mean stricter rules
as compared to the Community measures.
Does this subparagraph allow any stricter measure "relating to the environment," or do certain limitations apply? Two
kinds of limitations could, in principle, be distinguished. A
first one seems to follow from the use in Article 100a of the
words "major needs." These words could be read, however, as
a simpler way of referring to all of the grounds mentioned in
Article 36 without mentioning each one individually. We do
not believe, therefore, that only major needs of environmental
protection can justify stricter measures.
The real limitation flows from Article 36. It should be
noted that a Community directive cannot "legalize" national
measures that are normally incompatible with Articles 30
through 36. This means that the limitations developed by the
Court, in its case law on Article 36, apply. Such limitations
include, for example: the requirement to choose the instrument that would hinder intra-community trade to the least possible extent; and the "proportionality" requirement, according
to which the measure should not have negative effects disproportionate to the objective pursued.
That the restrictions of Article 36 apply is also demonstrated by another provision in Article 100a, according to
which the Commission, which must be notified of the measures, must confirm that these measures are neither a means of
arbitrary discrimination nor a disguised restriction on trade
between Member States.' 4 9 This means that the measures
must be compatible with the last sentence of Article 36. It is
interesting to note that this requirement applies ex post facto.
In other words, the Member State in question can apply the
measures without waiting for the Commission's opinion.
Article 100a does not provide for a sanction when the
Commission does not confirm the measure but only refers to
the procedure laid down by Article 169, the infringement pro148. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100a(4), added by Single European Act, supra
note 100, art. 18, at 8.
149. Id.
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cedure. 15 ° In order to somewhat strengthen this "sanction"
and to allow for more rapid action, the Commission or any
Member State may bring the matter directly before the Court if
it considers that improper use has been made of the powers
provided for in Article 100a. Improper use must be read to
include not only the case where the second subparagraph has
not been respected but also any infringement upon other applicable rules, especially Article 36.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF EC ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The implementation of European Community measures in
the environmental field takes two different forms. Generally
speaking, the Community does not have at its disposal the necessary infrastructure or the staff to apply the measures in individual cases. As is normal in the European Community, this is
left to the authorities of the Member States. Because most of
the acts take the form of directives, there is, however, another
aspect of implementation. Member States must amend their
legislation to bring it into line with the provisions of the directive, if they have not already done so, and must do so by the
deadline set in each directive.
Under Article 155, the Commission must ensure, inter
alia, that each of the twelve Member States effectively implements a directive.' 5 ' This constitutes an additional task for the
already limited number of staff working on environmental matters. In most cases the deadline is not met by the majority of
the Member States. Thus, many environmental directives only
reach their full effect long after their adoption.
Obviously, these are major weaknesses in the Community's environmental policy. The most obvious solution would
be to use regulations wherever possible. This has become
much easier now that action in the environmental field no
longer has to take the form of a directive, as was the case when
Article 100 was still being used. 5 2 The legal obstacle has,

thus, virtually been removed. A practical obstacle still exists,
150. See EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 169, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 56-57,
298 U.N.T.S. at 75.
151. Id. art. 155, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 53, 298 U.N.T.S. at 71.
152. Article 100 is, of course, still theoretically available for environmental action. In practice, however, almost all cases apply Article 100a or Article 130s.
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however. As indicated, Article 130t allows Member States to
adopt stricter measures than those adopted at the Community
level. It is hard to imagine how this could be done if the Community instrument takes the shape of a directly applicable regulation. 153
Another solution could be the setting-up by Member
States-possibly at the request of the Community-of procedures that would enable fast and accurate implementation of
directives. One could argue that Article 5 already requires
such procedures, and the Court has indeed accepted the notion that Article 5 creates certain obligations for the Member
States with regard to the implementation of directives.' 5 4
CONCLUSIONS FOR THE FEDERAL SYSTEM OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
At the beginning of this article, two questions were formulated. In what manner are the governmental powers in the environmental field distributed between the Community and the
Member-State levels, and to what extent can these powers be
exercised free from interference?
In reply to the first of these questions, we found that the
EC Treaties do not confer a general power to act. The Community's institutions can act only if the Treaties have created
the powers to do so. This also means that. those powers that
are not covered by the Treaties still reside with the' Member
States. This may look like a relatively easy criterion, but we
have found that there may be some surprises, particularly in
the environmental field. Before the SEA entered into force,
none of the three Treaties provided specific powers in the environmental field. One would, therefore, expect that the governmental powers in this field would reside with the Member
153. It is, of course, not absolutely impossible for Member States to adopt
stricter measures than those adopted at Community level. Before the adoption of the
SEA, a provision allowing stricter national measures was included in the Regulation
implementing CITES. See Regulation 3626/82, supra note 83. This was, however,
really a directive adopted in the form of a regulation, as is demonstrated by article 22
of the regulation, which requires Member States to notify the Commission of the
provisions adopted "for the implementation of this Regulation," a provision normally found in directives.
7,
154. See Commission v. Netherlands, Case 96/81, 1982 E.C.R. 1791, 1803,
12, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8841, at 7948.
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States. Yet, the Community has established a very broad environmental policy.
What is surprising is not so much the fact that environmental measures were adopted, but, rather, the scope of these
measures. Obviously, many measures in the environmental
field have economic consequences and will, thus, have a direct
bearing on the common or single market. For example, if
companies in one Member State are required to clean their
polluted sewer water before disposing of it, while their competitors in other Member States do not face such an obligation,
the latter clearly have a competitive advantage. This may result in trade distortions within the Common Market. It is this
that triggers the responsibility of the Community in this area.
The Community's environmental policy, however, is not
limited to measures that have this kind of direct bearing on the
Common Market. Even before the inclusion of specific environmental powers in the EEC Treaty through the SEA, the
Community adopted environmental measures that had little or
no effect on the Common Market in the manner described
above. These measures could, nevertheless, be adopted, because all of the Community's institutions, including the Court
of Justice, were willing to interpret the EEC Treaty's preambular reference to the improvement of the living and working
conditions of the peoples of the Member States in such a way
as to make the protection of the environment an objective of
the EEC Treaty.
The conclusion from this seems to be that although the
Community can act only if the powers to do so have been specifically granted, its institutions have interpreted these powers
so widely that an extremely broad range of activities are made
possible. This leaves only a limited number of areas outside
the scope of the Treaties.
The extension of Community powers into a large number
of areas does not automatically mean that Member States have
lost their governmental powers in these areas. There are certain areas within the Treaties in which the Community has socalled "exclusive competence," thus eliminating the ability of
Member States to act on their own initiative, whether or not
the Community has effectively occupied these areas. In many
other fields, however, Member States can act as long as the
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Community has not exercised its powers. The environmental
policy provides a good example of this. Member States could
develop their own policies until the Community decided to become active. The loss of Member-State powers in the environmental field did not suddenly occur when the Community
adopted its first measure in that field; rather, the loss of power
occurred gradually and only in cases of possible conflicts between Community and Member-State measures. 155 An exception to this general rule exists in cases where environmental
measures are part of another policy that happens to be one of
exclusive Community responsibility, such as the common commercial policy.
This illustrates that in determining the manner in which
powers of government are distributed, one must look whether
those powers are within or outside the scope of the Treaties.
With regard to the former, one must also look as to whether
such powers confer exclusive rights and duties on the Community institutions or, as long as there is no conflict with Community measures, whether they still allow Member-State activity.
This brings us to the second question. How is the freedom to exercise these governmental powers without interference guaranteed? As for the Community's powers, we have
found that the SEA has greatly increased the number of cases
in which the Council can make decisions with a qualified majority. 15 6 This has greatly diminished the possibility of individual Member States influencing the manner in which the Community exercises its powers, although the exact extent of the
decrease in influence requires a separate study. In the environmental field, however, this is only of limited importance,
because measures based on Article 130s will still, in most
cases, require unanimity.
There are, however, not only these political considerations of which acount must be taken, but legal considerations
as well. The Community's ability to exercise its powers as it
155. See Temple Lang, supra note 96, at 206-07.
156. Normally this would not have had a dramatic impact on the Council's decision-making process, as discussions were normally carried on until consensus was
reached. An amendment to the Council's rules of procedure, agreed upon in 1986,
allows the Commission and each Member State to ask for a vote at any time. It is this
change that has lead to a tremendous increase in the number of decisions reached by
a qualified majority.
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sees fit has been strengthened by the Court of Justice's case
law on exclusive competence, as well as the case law on conflicts-as in the ERTA case-which recognizes the supremacy
of Community law. Thus, if a Member State tries to act in an
area where the Community has already exercised its governmental powers, there is a legal remedy for the Community
against such intrusion.
Governmental powers in the environmental field do not,
however, reside solely with the Community. As has been
shown, such powers reside with the Member States as well.
But how can the Member States be sure that the Community
will not interfere with their acts? This question is of particular
importance because the legal guarantees 'surrounding Community powers seem stronger than the political guarantees, while
for the Member States, it seems to be the other way around.
Before the SEA came into effect, Community action on the
environment required unanimity in all cases. The SEA diminished this political guarantee against unwanted Community intrusion into areas so far covered by Member State legislation
only slightly, because measures adopted on the basis of Article
130s basically still require unanimity. Member States can,
therefore, "veto" any proposal that encroaches upon their
powers. In addition, a quasi-legal guarantee was inserted in
paragraph four of Article 130r. According to this provision,
the Community shall take action when the objectives can be
"better" attained at Community level than at the level of the
15 7
individual Member States.
It seems appropriate at this point to take a second look at
this provision and its exact meaning. In so doing, one should
perhaps make a distinction between the level at which decisions are reached and the level at which implementation takes
place. We have found that in the Community system, the latter
normally occurs at the Member-State level. There is, therefore, no real difference between the implementation of environmental measures decided at Community level and those decided at the national or regional level. Thus, it is not because
of differences in implementation that environmental objectives
157. See EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 130r(4), added by Single European Act,
supra note 100, art. 25, at 12.
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can be better attained at the Member-State, rather than the
Community, level.
The provision, therefore, probably applies to the decisionmaking level. It is, however, hard to see how the objectives can
be "better attained," because decisions are made at MemberState level, rather than by the Community. This might be the
case if the Member States possessed certain information that
the Community institutions did not have. However, Article 5
of the Treaty obliges Member States to "facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks,"' 5 8 which would include providing information necessary for deciding which measures
should be adopted.
There are, apparently, few cases imaginable in which the
objectives set out in Article 130r can be better attained because of the level of decision-making. This is not to say that
Community decisions will be called for in all cases. Environmental problems that exist in a small area and do not have an
impact outside the Member State in which they occur, normally could, and probably should, be dealt with at the local or
national level. This would, however, be because of considerations such as administrative efficiency, and not because such an
approach will "better attain" the objectives of the Community's environmental policy.
The conclusion, therefore, must be that the provisions in
Article 130r do not create a real legal guarantee for Member
States, in the sense that Member States will be "protected"
against a limitation of their powers by the Community in the
environmental area. Thus, the only guarantee for the Member
States is the political one, resulting from the voting requirements.
This virtual lack of legal guarantees for Member States,
coupled with the development by the Court of Justice of very
effective legal guarantees where Member States try to limit
Community powers, reflects the fact that the Community is still
in its "formative years." In the beginning, the Member States
did not need any legal guarantees because all political power
resided with them. This was not the case regarding Community institutions, which is why the Court of Justice developed
158. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5, Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 4, 298 U.N.T.S. at
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the legal instruments and theories to "help" the Community in
this regard.
Several developments, however, including the introduction by the SEA of majority voting requirements, have caused a
change in the distribution of political powers in a manner beneficial to the Community institutions. If this process continues-and there is no obvious reason why it should not-there
may come a time when the Member States also need some
legal guarantees that allow them to exercise their powers without Community interference.
Such a guarantee could well be the recognition of Member-State autonomy as a separate, though probably limited,
objective. In cases where the proposed measure would do
more harm to the objective of Member-State autonomy than it
would contribute to the achievement of another objective of
the Community, the former should then take precedence. This
is the sort of legal "guarantee" of Member-State freedom to
act that would seem to be an essential element of a "mature"
federal structure.
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